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Service by Publication: A Modern
Alternative
Darrell L. Sutton*
Samuel M. Lyon**
I. INTRODUCTION
Service is perhaps the most basic practice of law imaginable. All
plaintiffs must serve, and all defendants must be served, for a case to
proceed forward. Without service, there is no case to settle—no legal
battle to wage.
According to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]”1 Colloquially known as the Due
Process Clause, this phrase has significant implications for the
pendency of actions against defendants, and in particular, how those
defendants are served.2 While “traditional” service methods, such as
personal service, assure that defendants are aware of the actions
pending against them, so-called “alternative” service methods may not
provide the same assurances. Some alternative service methods may, in
fact, run afoul of the Supreme Court of the United States’ interpretation
of the Due Process Clause, thus abridging the constitutional rights of
the parties involved.
This leads to a necessary inquiry: do alternative service methods, in
particular, service by publication, meet the requirements of due process
*Partner, Sutton Law Group, LLC. Berry College (B.S., 2000); Mercer University School of
Law (J.D., 2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Associate, Sutton Law Group, LLC. Oglethorpe University (B.A., 2015); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., 2020). Member, Mercer Law Review (2018–2020); Editorin-Chief (2019–2020). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Many thanks to the editors of the
Mercer Law Review for their careful review and insightful suggestions regarding this
article. Also, thank you James K. Lyon, the youngest and sharpest legal mind I know.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving
Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1987).
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as laid out by the Constitution? If so, how are the requirements
measured relative to more traditional service methods?
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Service of Process in the United States of America
The Due Process Clause requires that state courts balance the state’s
interest against the individual’s interest in deciding whether the notice
provided under state law constitutes “reasonable” notice.3 Of course, the
Constitution provides a floor, not a ceiling, as to what is or is not
constitutional in cases where notice is required. While state laws can
therefore afford more protection for individuals, they cannot put in
place any laws that deny the Constitution’s basic protections.4
If a cause of action intends to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property, the defendant must be given notice of the pendency of the
action.5 This was set forth most clearly in Mullane v. Central Hannover
Bank and Trust Company,6 wherein the Supreme Court stated that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as
reasonably to convey the required information . . . and it must afford
a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance[.]
But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the
case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional
requirements are satisfied.7

In essence, the basic purpose of service of process is to ensure that
defendants know of the existence of actions, such that they can defend

3. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of
Constitutional Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 365, 373
(2008).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. Id. at 314–15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)).
Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not
the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is
reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice [] implicit in due process are satisfied.
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themselves from the claims made against them.8 If a defendant is
unaware of a claim, and a verdict is held against them, that would fail
to comply with the basic protections of the Due Process Clause and
would therefore be unconstitutional.9
State statutes discussing permissible service of process methods
reflect this minimum standard of constitutional protection. In Georgia,
for example, a defendant may be served by personal service, service
upon a legal guardian,10 conspicuous service,11 or service at the
“defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein.”12 These methods
reflect the—constitutional—minimum standard, in that they have the
highest chances of providing a defendant with notice of the action
pending against him or her in a court of law.13
Despite this, and while service has been described as among the most
basic procedures of litigation,14 state and federal rules have long
allowed different, arguably less reliable service methods. For example,
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)15 allows service
upon “an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of process” in addition to the state’s rules regarding service.16 While this
may seem identical to Georgia’s permissive service upon a legal
guardian, this is not necessarily the case. Georgia allows service upon a
legal guardian in the case of a legal minor or an individual who has
been judicially declared of unsound mind.17 By contrast, Rule 4’s
language is much broader and would, for example, allow service upon
an individual’s attorney so long as they have been declared their agent

8. Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.
9. Id.
10. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-4(e)(3)–(4) (2013).
11. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(6). Of course, other requirements must be met in accordance
with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(6), such as a principal sum of less than $200.00 and “reasonable
efforts hav[ing] been made to obtain personal service . . . .”
12. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7). O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1),(2), and (5) are excluded from this
discussion, as they address service upon corporate and municipal entities. Relative to a
discussion about the constitutionality of service by publication, these subsections only
muddy the waters. Exploration of these topics are outside of the scope of this Article.
13. After all, what could possibly provide more assurances than providing potential
defendants with copies of pleadings directly to their person or at their place of residence
with someone who lives with them?
14. See Sinclair, supra note 2, at 1184.
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(C). Of course, the “state’s rules” refers only to the state
where the action is pending.
17. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-4(e)(3)–(4).
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for purposes of service.18 This difference, though minor, is emblematic of
the distinction between service methods permitted under a state’s
statutory service scheme and those permissible under the federal rules.
One would think that a basic procedure such as service would have
distinct, reliable methods for service—for the most part, that holds true.
For example, the service methods allowed under Rule 4 and O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-4 allow many of the same service methods, all of which provide
assurances that the summons and complaint will make it safely into the
intended individual’s hands.19 After all, “[t]he fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”20
B. History of Alternative Service of Process & the Modern-Day
Framework by Which Constitutional Sufficiency is Determined
However, what happens when an individual cannot be found, and
therefore service cannot be perfected via “traditional” means? Serving
every defendant is neither possible nor practical, and in some cases,
defendants will conceal their location or evade service by traditional
means.
To combat this, jurisdictions have established different methods by
which a plaintiff can serve a defendant—so-called “alternative” methods
of service, which allow service upon an individual by methods less likely
to apprise a party of notice of the pendency of an action.21
The discussion regarding the validity of alternative service, in
particular, service by publication, goes as far back as the eighteenth
century.22 In the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff,23 attorney John
Mitchell sued Marcus Neff in Oregon state court, attempting to recover
for unpaid legal fees.24 Mitchell served notice of the suit by publication,

18. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c).
19. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 (2013); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c).
20. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
21. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f) (2013).
22. Arguably, service has its roots in a tradition dating back thousands of years. See
Sinclair, supra note 2, at 1187 (discussing the four-thousand-year tradition of notice,
which Sinclair relates to the Code of Eshnunna (requiring that they “shout” their action’s
beginnings) and medieval times (which used a sheriff to provide notice)).
23. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Notably, Pennoyer v. Neff is not about service by publication.
It is more often discussed in the context of first-year law courses relative to personal
jurisdiction, whereby it serves as the primary example of a state’s power to protect its
citizens from actions initiated in another state and the competing interests implicated
therein. It is herein discussed only to provide context about the centuries old discussion
surrounding service by publication. See DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MASTERING CIVIL
PROCEDURE 58 (Carolina Acad. Press, 3rd ed. 2017).
24. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719–20.
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not by personal service, upon Defendant Neff, who did not live in
Oregon. In that underlying suit, the Oregon state court entered a
default judgment against Defendant Neff—Mitchell was, therefore, able
to attach Neff’s later-purchased Oregonian land to satisfy the
outstanding judgment. Once completed, Mitchell sold the property to
Pennoyer, and Neff sued to recover the same.25
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Oregon state
court, affirming the court of appeals’ decision, which overturned the
judgment. The Supreme Court held that service by publication was
improper in this matter because Neff did not reside in the state of
Oregon.26 For the judgment against Neff to be valid, there needed to be
a sufficient nexus between the service and the notice apprised of the
action by the service method used.27 Therefore, while the Supreme
Court determined that service by publication is proper for in rem
proceedings, it was improper for in personam proceedings.28 In the
Court’s opinion, personal service was the only valid method of service to
provide the defendants the proper notice of the action pending against
them for in personam proceedings.29 Because the proceeding was
against Neff personally, and not against the property that was later
taken, service by publication was improper.30
Of course, Pennoyer serves as a foundational case in many first-year
law students’ civil procedure classes and is well recognized beyond its
relatively brief discussion of service by publication. As such, the
underlying importance today is largely lost due to subsequent cases
overruling Pennoyer’s holding, whereby service by publication can now
apply to both in rem and in personam matters.31 Furthermore, Pennoyer
merely discussed service by publication, but did not expound on its
many uses.
The framework for the modern determination of whether service
comports with the constitutional standards of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment comes from Mullane vs. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Company.32 In Mullane, the Supreme Court:
[R]ecognized that prior to an action which will affect an interest in
life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause of the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 736 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
339 U.S. at 314.
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Fourteenth Amendment, a State must provide “notice reasonably
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.”33

In Mullane, the notice given to the beneficiaries of the trust at issue
was by “publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with the
minimum requirements” of New York’s banking laws.34 The local
requirements for publication included filing a petition with the court
and publishing at least once a week for four successive weeks the name
and address of the trust company, a list of all participating trusts, and
the name and the date of the establishment of the trust fund.35 The
appellant argued that the notice and the statutory notice provisions
were “inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”36 It was not disputed that the only notice given to the
beneficiaries of this trust was by publication in the local newspaper.37
“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard.”38 The right to be heard is of little worth, however, unless
one is informed of the matter pending against him, such that he or she
can choose whether to appear or to default, to “acquiesce or contest.”39
Importantly, there is no formula by which the Court is beholden to in
making this determination.40
In Mullane, the Court recognized that publication alone is not a
reliable means of informing interested parties of the fact that their
rights are pending before the court, even going so far as to state that:
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a
newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the
newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will
never reach him are large indeed.41

The likelihood of an interested party taking notice in the context of a
trust, as in Mullane, wherein some of the beneficiaries are not and
33. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795 (1983) (quoting Mullane,
339 U.S. at 314).
34. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
35. Id. at 309–10.
36. Id. at 311.
37. Id. at 309.
38. Id. at 314 (quoting Grannis, 234 U.S. at 394).
39. Id. at 314.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 315.
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cannot be named, is even lower.42 Nonetheless, service by publication is
a “customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning.”43
In Mullane, where potential parties cannot be named with due
diligence, this customary substitute was widely accepted.44 However,
the Court went on to state that when an individual is known and their
place of residence is a known place, notice by publication may not be
adequate.45 For service by publication to be used and constitutionally
adequate, the facts of the case must be sufficient to determine that such
service is “reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.”46
In the case of Mullane, service by publication for known
individuals—such as, beneficiaries whose names were known to the
executor of the trust—was deemed to be inadequate.47 While the Court
recognized the possibility of different facts and circumstances, whereby
service by publication would be adequate, they stated that while:
Publication may theoretically be available for all the world to see . . .
it is too much . . . to suppose that each or any individual beneficiary
does or could examine all that is published to see if something may
be tucked away in it that affects his property interests.48

After all, “[g]reat caution should be used not to let fiction deny the
fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.”49
The principles announced in Mullane were unwaveringly adhered to
in the years to follow.50 In 1983, the Court added a new dimension to
the Mullane analysis. In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 51 a
property owner, Alfred Moore, executed a mortgage in favor of the
Mennonite Board of Missions. Unbeknownst to the Mennonite Board of
Missions, Moore failed to pay property taxes on the property. Under
Indiana law,52 the property could be sold due to outstanding property
42. Id.
43. Id. at 317.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 318.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 319.
48. Id. at 320.
49. Id. (quoting McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91).
50. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444
(1982).
51. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
52. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 6-1.1-24-1–6-1.1-24-17 (2015).
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taxes for more than fifteen months.53 However, before the sale, the
county auditor must have posted a notice in the County Courthouse and
published notice once a week for three consecutive weeks in the local
newspaper. The owner of the property was also entitled to notice by
certified mail to his last known address. However, there was no portion
of the Indiana statute by which mortgagees were notified of the
forthcoming sale. The County provided notice in precise compliance
with the statute, and therefore, Mennonite Board of Missions, as a
mortgagee, was not provided notice under the aforementioned statutory
scheme.54
The Court held that, because the Mennonite Board of Missions had a
legally protected property interest, they were entitled to “notice
reasonably calculated to apprise [them] of a pending tax sale.”55 Here,
because the Mennonite Board of Missions was identified in the
mortgage documents, they were easily identifiable, and a more reliable
form of notice was required.56 After all, notice to the property owner,
who was not in privity with the mortgagee/creditor and failed to protect
his own property interests, could not be expected to apprise the
mortgagee/creditor with actual notice of the action.57 Accordingly, the
County had an obligation to, at the very least, mail notice to the
Mennonite Board of Missions when “‘an inexpensive and efficient
mechanism such as mail service is available.’”58
Mullane and Mennonite Board of Missions provide the framework by
which the constitutional sufficiency of service by publication is today
determined. In essence, while service by publication is permissible in
limited circumstances, it should rarely be used in cases where the
identity of the person to be served is known, and considerations of more
reliable alternatives should be considered.
C. An Overview of Service by Publication in Georgia
Having described the analysis used to determine the constitutional
sufficiency of service by publication from the vantage point of the
federal floor, we now turn to Georgia law. As a general matter, whether
service by publication provides “reasonable” notice has always been a

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Mennonite Board of Missions, 462 U.S. at 792–93.
Id. at 793–94.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id. (quoting Greene, 456 U.S. at 455).

2022

SERVICE BY PUBLICATION

973

concern of Georgia’s courts, with cases discussing the same for nearly
half a century.59
Georgia has four methods for alternative service: (1) service by
publication, (2) personal service outside of the State, (3) service upon
persons located in a foreign country, and (4) service of persons residing
in gated and secured communities.60 As mentioned before, for the
purposes of this Article, only service by publication is discussed.61
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f)(1)(A) sets forth the requirements for service by
publication, which requires the movant to file an affidavit with the
court in support of service by publication when service is based on the
absentee party’s residence outside of the state and an unknown present
address.62 Service by publication, if the above conditions are met,
allowed the serving party to perfect service by publishing in a
newspaper four times within a sixty day period.63
In Abba Gana v. Abba Gana, the Georgia Supreme Court expressed
its doubts about the effectiveness of service by publication, saying that
“notice by publication is a notoriously unreliable means of actually
informing interested parties about pending suits.”64
[W]hether a proceeding is in rem or in personam, due process
requires that a chosen method of service be reasonably certain to give
actual notice of the pendency of a proceeding to those parties whose
liberty or property interests may be adversely affected by the
proceeding . . . . Because notice by publication is a notoriously
unreliable means of actually informing interested parties about
pending suits, the constitutional prerequisite for allowing such
service when the addresses of those parties are unknown is a

59. See Abba Gana v. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. 340, 304 S.E.2d 909 (1983).
60. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f).
61. Personal service outside of the state and service upon persons in foreign
countries, while important to preserve the constitutional rights of those served, ultimately
have a consideration of foreign policy and international agreement. See O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-4(f)(3)(A) (“By any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give
notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents[].”). Similarly, service upon a person in a gated
community essentially provides a method by which personal service can affect private
communities. As such, there is little to discuss relative to the constitutionality, or lack
thereof, of the same (unless, of course, an individual in a gated community evades service
to the extent where service by publication is the only method reasonably calculated to
apprise them of pendency of the action).
62. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f)(1)(A).
63. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f)(1)(C). Service must also be separated by seven days.
64. 251 Ga. at 343, 304 S.E.2d at 912.
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showing that reasonable diligence has been exercised in attempting
to ascertain their whereabouts.65

What, however, constitutes “reasonable diligence” to inform parties
about pending suits? Most often, it means “due diligence.”66 “[I]t is the
duty of the courts to determine whether the movant has exercised due
diligence in pursuing every reasonably available channel of
information.”67 If the movant does not exercise due diligence, there are
constitutional concerns, given that service by publication is “a
notoriously unreliable means of actually informing interested parties
about pending suits.”68
For example, in Styles v. Spyke Ten, LLC, 69 Spyke Ten failed to show
that Styles could not be found in the state or that he concealed himself
to avoid service. However, because Spyke Ten failed to pursue every
reasonable “channel of information” in attempting service, the trial
court abused its discretion by permitting service by publication.70 The
affidavit submitted by Spyke Ten showed that they had done the
following to attempt service: that their attorney had personally
searched for the defendant’s address and that Spyke Ten had attempted
service at the defendant’s last known location, which was attempted by
an unnamed skip tracer who had searched the Lexis-Nexis database to
find Styles’ address. An affidavit of the skip tracer was not filed.71
While this may seem like duly diligent effort, once a default
judgment was entered against Styles, it became unclear whether more
65. Id. (citations omitted).
66. See Styles v. Spyke Ten, LLC, 342 Ga. App. 122, 125, 802 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2017).
Of course, one manner in which the meaning of language can be determined is through
the use of extrinsic sources, such as dictionaries. Using a dictionary definition should
come with considerations for the time period in which the case was decided. In the case of
Mullane, a definition from the late 1960s and early-to-mid 1970s provides the best period
for determining what “reasonable diligence” meant at the time of the case being decided.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “reasonable” as “just; proper; ordinary or usual; fit and
appropriate for the end in view.” Reasonable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (4th ed.
1968). “Diligence” is defined as “prudence; vigilant activity; attentiveness; or care, of
which there are infinite shades, from the slightest momentary thought to the most
vigilant anxiety.” Diligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (4th ed. 1968). Combining
these two definitions creates a standard which requires attentiveness to the proper level,
considering the end in view. That end, of course, is the assurance of due process as
required by the United States Constitution.
67. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. at 343, 304 S.E.2d at 912.
68. Id.
69. 342 Ga. App. 122, 802 S.E.2d 369.
70. Id. at 127, 802 S.E.2d at 372 (quoting Abba Gana, 251 Ga. at 344, 304 S.E.2d at
912).
71. Id. at 123, 802 S.E.2d at 370.
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could have been done to ensure that service was reasonably calculated,
under the circumstances, to apprise Styles of notice of the pendency of
the action.72 For example, Styles contended that he lived at one of the
addresses where a copy of the Summons and Complaint were left, and
on cross-examination, Spyke Ten’s process server averred that he was
retained only “to post [on the] property,” indicating that he had not
attempted to determine whether Styles was present on the property at
the time of posting.73 In fact, the process server affirmed that while he
“did not see cars, a garden, or a garbage bin on the property . . . . [H]e
did not look on the Internet for any information about where Styles
might live [and] that he was not hired to research where Styles might
live.”74 When the process server was retained to conduct such research
on the location of someone whom he was going to serve, he would
perform searches on “investigative data bases” and conduct an “oldfashioned gum shoe checking out” of the location.75 The process server
did not conduct such minimal searches in the absence of being retained
to do so, and did not do so relative to Styles.76
The denial of Styles’ motion to set aside the default judgment was
therefore reversed.77 In so doing, the Georgia Court of Appeals
enumerated Spyke Ten’s seven due diligence failures: (1) Spyke Ten’s
attorney’s affidavit regarding the skip tracer shows only one source was
used in obtaining the correct address; (2) asserting that a skip tracer
was used, without providing specific details or dates, is inadequate to
show due diligence; (3) Spyke Ten provided limited instructions to serve
Styles at the wrong location (and to merely tack at the correct location),
as well as failing to instruct the processor where to investigate; (4)
other additional channels for obtaining information about potential
defendants were available, but not used, per the testimony of the
process server; (5) the envelope submitted as evidence to prove that the
Summons and Complaint that were mailed were not postmarked,
posted, or dated and therefore provided little evidentiary value to prove
that it was actually mailed; (6) the process server went to Styles’
location only once, and made no further attempts to locate or serve him;
and (7) “the process server offered no evidence to show that Styles was

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 123–25, 802 S.E.2d at 370–71.
Id. at 123–24, 802 S.E.2d at 370–71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127, 802 S.E.2d at 372.
Id.
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actually at [his address] at the time of the attempted service but
avoided coming to the door.”78
It can therefore be surmised that due diligence means exhausting
every reasonably available means of obtaining the defendant’s address
to properly serve them, as was expressed in Abba Gana.79
In Reynolds v. Reynolds,80 for example, the Georgia Supreme Court
noted that there were “obvious channels of information available . . . for
locating [the opposing party].”81 The court mentions individuals, such as
the wife’s daughter, who had contact with or knew the whereabouts of
the defendant/wife.82 The plaintiff/husband’s failure to ascertain the
defendant/wife’s address without making an “honest and well directed
effort” to use the available channels of information constituted a failure
to use reasonably diligent efforts to serve the wife.83 As such, the
Husband’s use of “service by publication did not meet the constitutional
requirements of due process.”84
In Georgia, then, it is clear that notice by publication should be used
only as a last resort. Service by publication has been described to be
“the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential defendant’s
attention the pendency of judicial proceedings,”85 and the Supreme
Court of the United States has gone so far as to say that notice by
publication should not be used when an interested party’s name and
address are “readily ascertainable” in actions where mailed service
could be alternatively used.86 These concerns persist today, as reflected
in the Georgia Supreme Court’s close attention to whether service by
publication meets the minimum standards. All of this is exacerbated by
the significant decline of newspapers as a part of an American’s daily
life.87

78. Id. at 126, 802 S.E.2d at 372.
79. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. at 340, 304 S.E.2d at 909.
80. 296 Ga. 461, 769 S.E.2d 511 (2015).
81. Id. at 463, 769 S.E.2d at 513.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Abba Gana, 251 Ga. at 344, 304 S.E.2d at 913).
84. Id. at 463, 769 S.E.2d at 513.
85. Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
86. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 797 (citing Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 210)
87. In 1964, eighty-one percent of American adults read the newspaper at regular
intervals; in 2018, less than sixteen percent reported doing the same. LEONARD DOWNIE
JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS 95 (2002); Elisa Shearer, Social
Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 10,
2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-printnewspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/.
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO SERVICE BY PUBLICATION VIA NEWSPAPER MEANS
If service by publication provided a mere “chance” of providing notice
of the pendency of an action in 1950, it provides nothing more than the
slightest sliver of hope today.88 Even when newspaper readership was
at its highest, service by publication was deemed “the method [] least
calculated” to provide notice to the defendant.89 Discussions about the
constitutionality of service by publication, and its potential abridgment
of due process rights, have been a mainstay in cases concerning
alternative service, and in particular, service by publication.90 How,
then, can it be said that service by publication meets the minimal
constitutional safeguards described in Mullane and Mennonite Board of
Missions, irrespective of state law’s additional protective measures,
provided the lessened likelihood of readership? How does newspaper
service, as described by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f), meet this standard
provided the case law of Abba Gana, Styles, and Reynolds?
While it is true that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f)(1)(A) requires that the
petitioner aver to the defendant’s unavailability and out-of-state
location, this often is not enough to ensure that due diligence has been
used in making that determination from the outset. According to
Reynolds, parties may no longer need to exhaust “every reasonably
avaliable channel of information” in finding the location of defendants.91
Rather, they must make an “honest and well directed effort” to use the
“obvious” channels available.92 Reynolds and Styles show the
deterioration of requirements for service by publication in
contravention of Abba Gana and Mullane. What alternatives exist,
then, which would afford notice in a manner more consistent with the
standards of the Constitution?
A. Social Media is not a Method Reasonably Calculated Under the
Circumstances to Provide Notice to a Party
As a preliminary matter, social media is not a method that should be
considered for service. Some commentators have argued that social
media is an appropriate means by which service can be effectuated.93 In
88. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(f)(1)(C), discussing
requirements for service by publication.
89. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382.
90. See supra Section II.
91. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. at 343, 304 S.E.2d at 912.
92. Reynolds, 296 Ga. at 463, 769 S.E.2d at 513 (quoting Abba Gana, 251 Ga at 343,
304 S.E.2d at 909).
93. Emily Davis, Social Media: A Good Alternative, for Alternative Service of Process,
52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 573 (2020).
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so arguing, proponents of the “service by social media” theory cite
international court cases from the late 2000s and early 2010s where
social media was considered an acceptable means of service under
particular conditions.94 These same proponents have noted that the
New York Supreme Court has provided permission to serve a defendant
with the Complaint and Summons using Facebook’s private messaging
system, which they cite to as proof that this is the way forward for
service by publication and alternative service.95
Further, advocates for the service by social media theory argue that
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram are possibly harder to resist than
drugs, and that, if the purpose of service is to provide the defendant
with actual notice, then using a well-and-often-used social media site
makes sense.96 This is especially so when considering costs incurred for
more traditionally recognized service methods.97 In so arguing,
proponents of the social-media-service-method push back against the
use of alternative service by publication, which is described as more
costly and less effective than the potential use of social media.98
Despite the attractive features of service by publication, potential
issues abound, such as inauthentic or deceptive accounts.99 Take, for
example, the popular MTV show “Catfish,” wherein individuals use
another individual’s name, image, or likeness (often times combining
the name, image, and likeness of different individuals) to create a fake
online persona.100 At what point would an individual who has created
an online account based on the identifying features of another
individual be able to accept service for that person; is such a thing
possible?
Despite this noted shortcoming, proponents of this theory fail to
consider inequities in Internet accessibility, and additionally fail to
account for the ever-changing nature of social media.101 In November
2019, only 79.4% of persons aged three years or older in the United

94. Davis, supra note 93, at 588–89.
95. Id. at 589.
96. Id. at 589–90.
97. Id. at 590.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 595.
100. Id.; CATFISH: THE TV SHOW, https://www.mtv.com/shows/catfish-the-tv-show (last
visited Nov. 7, 2021).
101. Joseph Johnson, Internet Usage Penetration in the United States in November
2019,
by
State,
STATISTA
(Jan.
27,
2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/184691/internet-usage-in-the-us-by-state/.
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States had access to the internet.102 That same percentage reflects
Georgia’s citizenries’ access to the internet.103 This is notwithstanding
the ever-changing nature of social media. For example, Facebook
recently announced its transition from “Facebook” into “Meta,” a
company that has expressed visions of creating a “metaverse.”104 In
addition to virtual reality (VR) integration, this new-and-improved
platform will allow users to check other platforms as well, such as Slack
or Instagram.105
As Meta integrates social media platforms in a singular,
indistinguishable monolith, courts should be more cautious. If
Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp are held under a single
corporation’s control, potential service by publication methods using
these platforms, under the social-media-service model, may be
restricted by a singular privatized group. Putting service into
Facebook’s hands does not bode well for our representative democracy.
There remain additional questions regarding circumstances where
social media users have multiple accounts on the same platform. Take,
for example, the use of so-called “finsta” (fake-Instagram) accounts,
wherein people use fake names in order to post more personal content,
such as partying, illicit drug use, or extramarital activities.106 Would
service on these accounts be sufficient to allow an individual to proceed
in a case without abridging the Constitutional rights of the other party,
or would a party with multiple accounts have to designate a single
account as their “service” account? Presently, there is no way to

102. Johnson, supra note 101. Access to internet ranged anywhere from 74.3% (North
Carolina) to 88.2% (Colorado).
103. Id.
104. Lauren Goode, Look Over Here, Kids, It’s the Metaverse, WIRED (Oct. 20, 2021,
4:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-connect-metaverse/.
105. Goode, supra note 104. Instagram was purchased by Meta (at the time, Facebook,
Inc.) on April 9, 2012, for a purported $1,000,000,000. Thomas Houston, Facebook to Buy
Instagram
for
$1
Billion,
THE
VERGE
(Apr.
9,
2012,
1:06
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2012/4/9/2936375/facebook-buys-instagram.
106. Caroline Forsey, What’s a Finsta? We Explain This Confusing Instagram Trend,
HUBSPOT (Oct. 15, 2019, 5:38 PM), https://blog.hubspot.com/marketing/finsta. “Finsta”
accounts recently made headlines during the Senate Commerce subcommittee on
consumer protection when Senator Blumenthal asked whether Facebook was willing to
“commit to ending Finsta.” This prompted Facebook’s Chief of Safety, Antigone Davis, to
have to explain the concept to the seventy-five-year-old Senator. It’s okay, Senator
Blumenthal, we don’t really get it either. See What Sen. Blumenthal’s ‘finsta’ Flub Says
About Congress’ Grasp of Big Tech, NPR (Oct. 4, 2021, 5:52 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/10/04/1043150167/sen-blumenthals-finsta-flub-renewsquestions-about-congress-grasp-of-big-tech.
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universally verify that an account is associated with a private
individual.107
These shortcomings and potential issues have been recognized by the
courts, despite not being recognized by proponents for the social-mediaservice-method. In Joe Hand Promotions , Inc. v. Carrette,108 the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas stated, “It is unclear . . .
that allowing an unconventional method of service via Facebook would
comport with traditional notions of due process, or would achieve the
desired result of effectuating service on defendants.”109 This is but one
example of a court denying service via the unconventional method of
social media, wherein the lack of verification regarding the authenticity
of an individual’s Facebook page, the international nature of the action,
or where alternatives and less costly and or more reasonable means
were available, were cited as the underlying reasons for the denial.110
These cases are emblematic of the issues with service by social media,
and should be taken as examples of the cautionary method courts
should employ.
B. Alternative Service Methods Must Synergize with Other Facets of
Location Tracking
Alternative service methods, which are utilized to supplant or extend
service by publication, must synergize with more reliable methods of
location and address tracking. It is our contention that service by
publication in Georgia should be effectuated via the tandem use of
certified mail and a centralized system of addresses maintained by the
state government.
State governments are in the best position to ensure that the
protections of the Constitution are maintained, and the balance often
discussed in Supreme Court of the United States cases—wherein the
state has a vested interest in protecting the interests of its citizenry—
has already employed. While no states require obtaining and carrying
identification cards, such as a driver’s license or an “ID card,” the
practical reality is that ID cards are required to open bank accounts, to
purchase age-restricted items such as alcohol or tobacco, and board

107. How Do I Request a Verified Badge on Facebook?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1288173394636262 (last visited Nov. 13, 2021). Note this
verification badge is only available for businesses and notable individuals.
108. No. 12-2633-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109731, at *1 (D. Kan. July 9, 2013).
109. Id. at *3.
110. See id. at *1; Qaza v Alshalabi, No. 54308/2016, 2016 NYLJ LEXIS 4146, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2016).
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airplanes. ID cards are available for a nominal fee, making them
available to nearly everyone regardless of socio-economic status.111
Using this system in conjunction with certified mail offers not only a
cost-effective solution to assure that service by publication is affording
notice to potential parties to a lawsuit, but also would provide
individuals with more assurance that the opposing party received notice
of the action than publishing in the local newspaper. Having the option
to use certified mail when serving an individual, which is not presently
allowed in Georgia, provides a reliable and cost-effective method of
service when used in tandem with a centralized system. Certainly this
is a more cost-effective solution than a skip trace or simply posting in a
newspaper.
A centralized service system service would allow the state to have a
compelling reason for which they maintain an up-to-date system of
addresses. Individuals would also have a vested interest in ensuring
that their address is up to date, or failing. Failing to keep your address
up to date could result in a default judgment being held against you
should an individual fail to maintain accurate records.
Further, there could (and should) be built-in protections for homeless
individuals. For example, providing these individuals with subsidized
post office boxes would not only allow those individuals to maintain a
centralized location at which they can secure mail, but it also would
allow them to receive that service at a discounted or free price where it
doesn’t otherwise already exist. Of note, there are currently numerous
problems with homelessness relative to service, as service by
publication is unlikely to apprise homeless individuals with notice of
the pendency of the action. While the social media service model would

111. How
to
Apply
for
a
New
Identification
Card,
DMV.COM,
https://www.dmv.com/apply-idcard?tg1=DVA&utm_content=dmv.com&utm_medium=dmv_&tg7=dmv_&utm_source=d
mv.com&tg9=dmv.com&utm_term=organic_dmv&utm_campaign=organic_dmv
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2021). Costs of ID cards can range from as low as $5 to as high as $32.
How to Apply for a New Identification Card in Arkansas, DMV.COM,
https://www.dmv.com/ar/arkansas/apply-idcard?tg1=DVA&utm_content=dmv.com&utm_medium=dmv_&tg7=dmv_&utm_source=d
mv.com&tg9=dmv.com&utm_term=organic_dmv&utm_campaign=organic_dmv
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2021) ($5 ID card fee). How to Apply for a New Identification Card in
https://www.dmv.com/ga/georgia/apply-idGeorgia,
DMV.COM,
card?tg1=DVA&utm_content=dmv.com&utm_medium=dmv_&tg7=dmv_&utm_source=d
mv.com&tg9=dmv.com&utm_term=organic_dmv&utm_campaign=organic_dmv
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2021). Despite the range in cost, Voter ID cards remain free in many
states, and require registration with an address. Should service be tied to the use of an
ID, we would further propose a way to obtain the same for free, such that concerns
surrounding socio-economic ability are mitigated.
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mitigate these issues to some degree, homeless individuals who have
consistent access to a physical mailing address would be afforded a
more reliable way to receive notice of dependency of an action in
conformity with the Due Process Clause.
Finally, individuals who move often, such as for military service or
for other leisure purposes such as retirement, are well-served by any
statutory scheme incorporating a centralized service system. They
easily report their changed location, such that service is not delayed due
to their relocation. Obviously, any mandatory reporting regarding
relocation is more involved than the current system. However, such
mandatory reporting would likely become as routine as mailforwarding, while equally as straightforward. Any statutory scheme
combining certified mail to a centralized location can, and should,
incorporate a grace period for individuals to report their change of
address.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no perfect system. Service by publication, particularly via
newspaper publication, is an antiquated practice, underscored by the
lower readership of newspapers today. It is our contention that the
practice of publishing four times in a “local” newspaper affords no
greater certainty that an individual will be apprised of an action
against him than they would be if the notice of the action were written
in the sky above their city of residence. At the very least, “sky writing”
would come with the likelihood that an individual is outside on any
given day, provided that the likelihood of an individual looking up is
greater than them picking up a newspaper.
One thing is for certain—a new system needs to be put in place to
ensure that individuals constitutional rights are not abridged. This
system needs to reflect modernity, not antiquity. Service by publication
“is the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential
defendant’s attention the pendency of judicial proceedings.”112
Practically, there is no guarantee that individuals can be found
consistently for the purpose of service. The introduction of a centralized
address system would increase the likelihood that individuals are
served in accordance with their constitutional rights as provided by the
Due Process Clause.

112. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382.

